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1. INTRODUCTION
When a corporation's board of directors takes action to defeat a tender
offer they often argue that they are acting in the best interests of the
corporation and shareholders. When shareholders attempt to challenge the
actions of directors through judicial action, the courts confer upon the latter
the benefits of the business judgment rule and its presumption of loyalty
and care on the part of the directors. The judicially created primary
purpose approach (discussed infra) to the duty of loyalty, and the difficulty
for shareholders in overcoming the presumption of care, calls into question
whether the business judgment rule creates a presumption that shields
director's actions from serious scrutiny.
In this article I examine whether it is appropriate for courts to apply the
business judgment rule in reviewing management's actions that defeat a
tender offer. The article begins with an analysis of the economic effects on
shareholders of successful tender offers as opposed to those that are
defeated by management. Having determined that the defeat of tender
offers is generally contrary to the interests of shareholders, it is appropriate
to question whether such actions by directors should be protected through
the application of the business judgment rule. Consequently, I next look at
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the rule itself and review the development of case law as it has been
applied in the takeover context. This is followed by a discussion of the
reasons the rule should not be applied to management resistance and is
illustrated by an examination of the judicial approach followed in the case
involving the attempted takeover of Marshall Field & Co. in 1978.'
Finally, I propose a rule which would preclude management from using
the business judgment rule as a shield to prevent scrutiny of its actions
when challenged judicially. In support of this proposition I argue that a
tender offer creates a contractual relationship between the bidder and the
owners of the corporation to which management is not a party and in which
it should not interfere. Furthermore, shareholders and management alike
are afforded the protections of the Williams Act, state anti-takeover
legislation, and shareholder approved shark repellent.
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TENDER OFFERS
In his 1979 article on takeover bids2 Martin Lipton opens with
reference to the "legal, moral and practical questions faced by the directors
of a company that becomes the target of an unsolicited takeover bid.",
3
Although his article is essentially an economic analysis of the role of target
management in hostile takeovers it is peppered throughout with references
to ethical and moral considerations. Early on, Lipton shows that his
disdain for takeovers is at least partially based upon the idea that we should
differentiate between those who invest in equity securities for short-term
profit and those who are in it for long-term individual and collective gain
(though just how such a differentiation could be made in practical terms is
not made clear):
Many of the lawsuits and much of the agitation for changes in the
existing rules come from certain arbitrageurs and professional
investors .... [I]t would not be unfair to pose the policy issue as:
I Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S.1092
(1981) [hereinafter Panter ].




Whether the long-term interests of the nation's corporate system
and economy should be jeopardized in order to benefit speculators
interested not in the vitality and continued existence of the business
enterprise in which they have bought shares, but only in a quick
profit on the sale of those shares?
Much of the opposition to hostile takeovers, and subsequent support for
target management's resistance to tender offers, is based on the idea that
takeovers are bad for virtually everyone except the raiders and arbitrageurs.
A substantial amount of case law and literature is premised on the idea that
shareholder welfare is harmed by takeovers-or at least that shareholders
do not lose when management successfully defends against a takeover
attempt.5 Any analysis of target management's duties requires that this
threshold issue be addressed.
The economic basis for Lipton's thesis is a study of thirty six defeated
tender offers. Of those 36, over 50% were trading (at the time of his
article) at a price higher than the original tender offer. This leads him to
the conclusion that "the shareholders of more than 50% of the targets are
better off today than if the defeated tender offer had succeeded."6  As
Lipton admits, the comparison does not take into account discounting for
the time value of money and ignores dividends paid in the interim period.
This analysis also fails to make comparisons between the share price of
defeated takeover attempts and the ultimate trading prices following
successful tender offers (short-term or long-term). A subsequent study,8 in
support of the Lipton thesis "purports to show that the shareholders of
between 45% and 97% of all targets did better, as a result of the defeat of
the offer, than they would have done if the offer had succeeded." 9 This
study takes the same basic approach as does Lipton but compares the prices
after discounting for inflation. Both of these studies are fundamentally
flawed in that they measure the wrong thing. The Lipton study views
success as occurring if the investor can eventually receive more in the
market than the tender price. The Kidder study merely requires that the
4 Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
5 See e.g. Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1028 (1982); LIPTON, supra note 2; Richard Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare,
and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1985).
6 Lipton, supra note 2, at 106-07.
Id.
9 Kidder, Peabody & Co., submitted to the SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers
(1983), quoted in Easterbrook and Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 277, 281 (1984).
Id.
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investor eventually match the tender offer price after adjustment for
inflation. This might be appropriate if the stock market merely reflected
inflation. However, few, if any, would argue that matching inflation is the
mark of successful investing. The correct analysis would compare the
ultimate trading price with what the shareholder would have attained by
selling at the tender offer and then reinvesting that money in a diversified
equity portfolio. This approach recognizes the reality of investor behavior.
If a shareholder received $50 per share in a tender offer two years ago and
invested that amount in a diversified equity portfolio, the investor would
have gained $10 in that first year.10 At the end of the second year the
investment would be worth $72. Lipton would regard as successful a
value of $50 at the end of the second year and the Kidder study would
identify $52.53 as not having lost any money." The past two years have
shown equity returns above the historical average and a CPI below average.
However, in an "average" year for both, the analysis would result in a
smaller spread but the fundamental distinction would still hold true.
Three other studies on the effect on share price of defeating tender
offers show evidence which sharply conflicts with the Kidder, Peabody &
Co. study and that of Lipton. These studies developed a beta for the stocks
of companies which were the target of tender offers. The betas were
developed by comparing the movements in the stock's price relative to the
market as a whole or within the given industry. Next, the studies compared
the changes in prices before, during, and after tender offers to their betas
(relative to the market as a whole) in order to determine the effects of the
tender offer, auction, and the subsequent success or defeat by management.
In comparing the share prices, where the company was successfully
auctioned, to the prices when the tender offer was defeated the studies
found average losses of 15%2, 52%13 and 29%14 when management
successfully defeated the offer. Although there is significant difference
among the results of these studies, they all lend strong evidence to refute
Lipton's position.
Another aspect of Lipton's thesis is that "experience and common
sense prove that.., tender offer bids are not so different from other major
business decisions as to warrant a unique sterilization of the directors in
10 New York Stock Exchange earning 20% from 2/1/95-2/1/97.
Annual Consumer Price Index of 2.5%.
12 Asquith, Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 51 (1983).
13 Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirr Tender Offers: Information or
Synergy, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1983).
14 Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?, as
quoted in Easterbrook and Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV.
277, 283 (1984).
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favor of direct action by the shareholder."' 5 Lipton fails to provide much
argument for this position aside from "common sense." He fails to take
into consideration the inherent conflict of interest in directors' efforts to
block an action which will likely result in the loss of their jobs. In response
to criticism of his economic analysis, Lipton responds by stating that as
"long as the economic benefits of takeovers are debatable, rejection or
acceptance of a tender offer should continue to be left to the business
judgment of the target's board."' 6  The extension of this logic (i.e.
"debatable") would forever preclude the questioning of the actions of a
board of directors by courts.
Lipton uses the results of his study as the basis for the argument that
target management should not be limited in defending against unsolicited
tender offers and should be given the benefit of the business judgment rule.
However, a hostile tender offer at a premium price often results because
the market has valued the corporation at a particular price (a function of
assets and current management) and a raider believes that it is worth
substantially more under different management; or possibly the assets alone
are worth more than the assets as managed by current management. When
a tender offer succeeds, shareholders receive a premium on their
investment. They will typically reinvest that premium which, in turn,
contributes to growth in the economy and in employment. Corporate
management in general is disciplined when the threat of takeovers is
significant and their ability to block them is limited. A rule that limits
management's ability to prevent or defeat tender offers-a contractual
arrangement between the buyer and seller of a security- or at least
provides for merit review, would benefit virtually everyone except
incompetent officers and directors. Management would improve;
shareholders would profit; the amount available to capital markets would
increase; employment would increase and; consumers would benefit from
increased competition and improved management. 7
HI. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The business judgment rule creates a rebuttable presumption that the
board of directors and officers have acted: 1) on an informed basis; 2) in
good faith; and 3) in the honest belief that they are acting in the best
15 Lipton, supra note 2, at 103-04.
16 Martin Upton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L REV. 1231, 1233 (1980).
17 See Bebchuk, supra note 5; Booth, supra note 5; Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The
Proper role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1164
(198 1); [hereinafter Easterbrook and Fischel].
1998]
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interests of the corporation and shareholders." This presumed duty is
generally divided into two parts: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
The duty of care requires that directors be fully informed about the
decisions made and the duty of loyalty requires that they not act in a self
serving manner. The rationale for the rule includes the goals of: 1)
providing management with the freedom to develop policy; 2) encouraging
competent people to become directors (to "remove the fear of liability for
honest mistakes") and; 3) to relieve the courts of second guessing "complex
corporate decisions."' 9 Although the duty is often expressed as a fiduciary
duty, in the corporate context a less stringent application is envisioned-
the shareholder is not viewed as cestuis que trust, as this approach would
not be workable.20 If directors were held to strict fiduciary duty a
corporation could not conduct business because there is some level of self
interest in every decision made by directors. A pure fiduciary is prohibited
from any transaction that could be seen to involve a conflict of interest. As
one court noted, "the business judgment rule seeks to alleviate this problem
by validating certain situations that otherwise would involve a conflict of
interest."
2'
In the takeover context the duty of care requires that the directors
invest time for a thorough investigation of the proposal, thoroughly
investigate any recommendations they receive, and conduct a thorough
review of all documentation. 22 Disagreement arises over the applicability
of the business judgment rule in the context of an unsolicited tender offer.
Although it is possible for directors to fulfill their duty of care, their actions
should almost always raise a question as to whether they have faithfully
discharged their duty of loyalty to the owners of the corporation, namely,
the shareholders. Many correctly argue that the application of the rule is
appropriate in the conduct of ordinary business but not in the takeover
context (see discussion infra).
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW
One of the early cases evaluating the actions of directors in the
takeover context is Bennett v. Propp.23 The case involved the ratification
by the board of directors of the chairman's decision to repurchase some of
the company's outstanding shares when faced with a raider offering to
18 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
19 David Schubert, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co: A New Era of Fiduciary Duty, 38
BAYLOR L. REV. 687, 693 (1986) [hereinafter Schubert].
20 Id. at 689.
21 See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980).
22 See Smith v. VanGovkoM, 488 A.2d at 873.
23 Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962).
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purchase one share over 50% of those outstanding on a first-come first-
serve basis.2 After determining that the action was taken primarily in order
to retain control, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled this an improper
purpose, citing earlier cases.25 The court held that "the burden should be on
the directors to justify such a purchase as one primarily in the corporate
interest.''26 This sentence would lead to the "primary purpose rule" which
courts have used to provide the protection of the business judgment rule so
long as maintaining control was not the primary purpose of the director's
actions. As a result, the jury is removed as the arbiter in the determination
of which side is supported by the preponderance of evidence. Following
this rule, courts can decide this as a matter of law and effectively bar
consideration of the board's actions on the merits. The court in Bennett
then went on to absolve most of the directors by finding that they had a
reasonable basis for their actions. Deferring to their "business judgment"
the court said that it would not second guess them in their decision to
support the chairman, thus opening the door for wide latitude in director's
actions to block a takeover bid.27
Two years later the same court returned to the issue in Cheff v.
Mathes.28 Citing Bennett the court approved the decision to purchase
shares so long as the primary purpose was not to perpetuate control.29 The
burden was placed upon the board, because of the significant possibility of
a conflict of interest, to prove that the action was primarily in the
corporation's interest, that they had reasonable grounds to fear a danger to
corporate policy and, that they acted in good faith (loyalty) and after
reasonable investigation (care).30 The court ignored the fact that there is
always a danger to corporate policy in takeovers-this is the essence and
rationale for most tender offers. Although the trial court determined that
the directors had acted out of an improper purpose the Supreme Court,
apparently deciding that there was evidence to the contrary, stated that "this
question was a matter of business judgment" and overturned the lower
Id. at 406.
25 Id. at 408; see Macht v. Merchants Mortgage and Credit Co., 22 Del.Ch. 70, 194 A. 23
(DeI.Ch. 1937) (use of corporate funds by dominating director to assist him in procuring his control is
illegal); see also Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 DeI.Ch. 247, 256, 17 A.2d 309 (Del.Ch. 1941) (general rule
approved); see also Andersen v. Albert & J.M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 90 N.E.2d 541 (Mass. 1950) (use
of corporate funds by directors to purchase stock for themselves and for the corporation to obtain
control is a breach of fiduciary duty).
26 See Bennett, 187 A.2d at 408.
27 Id.
28 See Cheff v. Mathes, 190 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
29 Id. at 554.
30 Id
19981
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court's decision. 3' This calls into question whether any significant and
realistic limitations are placed upon management actions in the takeover
context.
In 1972 the Tenth Circuit ruled on a share repurchase case involving
the Denver Post in Colorado.32 While recognizing a fundamental duty to
shareholders on the part of directors, the court described the newspaper's
duty as threefold: "to stockholders, to the employees, and to the public. 33
In support of this the court noted that "every state in the Union authorizes
by statute corporate contributions for various purposes," thus introducing
the idea that directors could take into consideration constituencies other
than shareholders in defending against takeovers. 34 Although statutes allow
for "contributions for various purposes," they do not provide that
management can authorize contributions in disregard of shareholders. The
court then inquired into the motives of management and found that the
motive to retain control is no more "sinister" than the motive of the raider.35
This completely ignores the fact that the raider owes no fiduciary duty to
the shareholders; management, on the other hand, does. Although the court
referred to the duty owed to shareholders, the actions of the directors were
apparently upheld because they argued they were considering the
employees and the public by considering the quality of the newspaper
itself.36 The court did not consider whether control was the primary
purpose and did not apply a balancing test to weigh the interests of
employees and the public against those of the shareholders. This holding
could be interpreted to mean that any detrimental effect on other
constituencies may outweigh the concerns of shareholders. Finally, the
court ruled that the directors' discretionary powers, "if exercised honestly
and with reason is not subject to control by either the stockholders or the
courts. '37 Although the court had reviewed the merits of the case, this
assertion of the business judgment rule placed the burden clearly on the
plaintiffs and, when combined with the broad discretion granted in serving
constituents other than the shareholders, made it virtually impossible for
the plaintiffs to succeed.
Three years after Herald the Delaware courts ruled on a case in which
the plaintiffs sought an injunction against the selective redemption of
preferred stock which would effectively maintain a 53% control of the
31 Id. at 556-57.
32 See Herald company v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 108.
34 Upton, supra note 2, at 106-07.
35 Id. at 109.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 110.
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company by board members following the expiration of a stock trust fund.38
After the plaintiffs alleged a primary purpose of maintaining control the
court clearly stated such a purpose to be improper and balanced the
evidence to find in favor of the injunction.39 Although the corporate charter
and bylaws expressly provided for the redemption, the court ruled that the
action could be scrutinized.4 At this point the contours of the law were
less than clear and shareholders had some reason to believe that director's
actions would be carefully scrutinized by the courts.
Two federal cases involving Delaware corporations clearly established
the standard applicability of the business judgment rule in the takeover
context.41 In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. the plaintiffs filed a class
action suit against the directors of Marshall Field & Co. for federal
securities violations and breach of fiduciary duty for their actions,
including the filing of antitrust suits which the plaintiffs alleged were
aimed primarily at maintaining control. At the outset the court announced
that the business judgment rule applied in the takeover context to the same
extent that it applied in other business decisions and that the initial burden
of overcoming the presumption was squarely on the plaintiffs.42 The
standard to be applied for overcoming the presumption was "fraud, bad
faith, gross overreaching or abuse of discretion. The court then gave the
justification for applying the primary purpose rule: "control is always
arguably 'a' motive in any action taken by a director. Hence plaintiffs
could always make this showing and thereby undercut the purpose of the
rule. '' 4 Such a result would mean only that the plaintiffs could survive a
directed verdict or motion to dismiss-not that they would win the case.
Because a majority of Marshall's directors were "independent" the court
held that the presumption of good faith was heightened and categorically
rejected the plaintiff's contention that the board should be required to
establish a compelling business purpose for its actions.45
In Johnson v. Trueblood the Third Circuit applied essentially the same
reasoning and arrived at the same conclusions: the business judgment rule
applied and the plaintiffs bore the burden of showing that the primary
purpose of the directors' actions were to maintain control or that they had
38 See Petty v. Penntech Papers, 347 A.2d 140 (Del.Ch. 1975).
39 Id. at 142.
40 Id. at 143.
41 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 271.
42 See Panter, 646 F.2d at 292.
Id.
Id. at 294.
45 Id. at 294-95.
19981
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acted out of "some sort of bad faith. ''46 Furthermore, if the plaintiffs
survived a directed verdict the defendant would merely be required to
"show that the transaction in question had a valid corporate business,
purpose. 47 It is nearly impossible to imagine a scenario where directors
could not put forth some kind of valid business purpose. Both Johnson and
Panter had strong, well-reasoned dissents.
In 1982 a U.S. Supreme Court case indirectly called into question the
legitimacy of taking actions that would prevent shareholders from
accepting or rejecting a tender offer.4 ' The case struck down an Illinois
anti-takeover statute for violating the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Among other rationales, the court stated that the statute
interfered with the shareholders' right to obtain the highest price available
for the company's' stock.49 The court also stated that tender offers relate to
a stock transfer between a shareholder and a third party and did not concern
the corporation's internal affairs.50 Although the ruling could have been
read to apply to a court's investigation of management's motives for
actions concerning control issues (i.e. primary v. "a" purpose), it had no
significant effect on the continued application of the business judgment
rule.
In a 1982 shareholder derivative suit alleging corporate waste5' the
Delaware Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a director is
"disinterested" (independent) and the effect this has on the application of
the business judgment rule. Their definition of disinterested was that which
is applied in the ordinary business situation: "directors can neither appear
on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial
benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing. 52 Although the court limited
the protection of the business judgment rule to "disinterested" directors, its
definition served to give that protection to virtually any director, absent
fraud. Where such interest was found to exist, a majority of the remaining
directors would have to approve the transaction."3 That directors are ever
considered disinterested or independent is a questionable proposition. The
Aronson court essentially ignored the potential for conflict of interest in-
46 See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d at 292-93.
,47 Id. at 293.
48 See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
49 Id. at 635.
50 Id. at 639-40.
51 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984).
52 Id. at 812.
Id.
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herent in the takeover context and placed the initial burden on the plaintiff,
applying a standard of "gross negligence" in looking at the duty of care.
M
Three months after Aronson the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ruled on a case in which shareholders sought an injunction
prohibiting the board from issuing and voting a block of shares through a
wholly owned subsidiary and Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP). 5 The
court applied the business judgment rule and required that the plaintiffs go
forward with evidence that showed self interest on the part of directors:
"Once a prima facie showing is made that directors have a self-interest in a
particular corporate transaction, the burden shifts to them to demonstrate
that the transaction is fair and serves the best interests of the corporation
and it shareholders. 6 The court considered the ESOP to be "solely" a tool
of self-perpetuation and went on to say that it "strains credulity to suggest
that the retention of control over corporate affairs played no part in their
plans" 57 Although not specifically enunciating the standard being used, it
appears that the court applied a balancing test to the claims of the two sides
and felt that the evidence supported the claim of plaintiffs more than the
defendants and granted the injunction: there is a "strong inference that the
purpose of the transaction was not to benefit the employees but rather to
solidify management's control of the company. 58  The decision could
easily be read to indicate that the court was going to scrutinize the actions
of boards in defending against a hostile takeover. However, this decision
was limited to a very narrow set of facts and did not stand as precedent for
any general application.
In 1985 and 1986 the Delaware Supreme handed down three decisions
that further refined and solidified the law regarding the rights and duties of
directors in the takeover context. In Smith v. Van Gorkom 9 the board of
directors approved a merger at a hastily convened meeting where the
President proposed the plan and the corporation's Chief Financial Officer
stated that the $55 per share price proposed was within a "fair range.
The court held that directors are protected by the business judgment rule
which creates a presumption that the board "acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company." 61 The burden was placed upon those attacking
54 Id. at 812-13.
55 See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (1984).
56 Id. at 264.
57 Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
58 Id. at 265.
59 Smith v. VanGorkom, 488 A.2d at 858.
6 d. at 867.
61 Id. at 872 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
1998]
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the decision to show that the duty of care had not been satisfied.62 The
determination of whether a business judgment is an informed one turned on
whether the directors had informed themselves "prior to making a business
decision, of all material information reasonably available to them."63 The
majority of the court found that the directors had acted without knowledge
of valuation data which they could have obtained and that, therefore, the
business judgment rule should not protect their actions.
64
Five months later the court handed down its decision in Unocal Corp.
65v. Mesa Petroleum Co., one of the seminal rulings in the area. In ruling
on a discriminatory self-tender offer to fend off a hostile tender offer the
court ruled that the board "has an obligation to determine whether the offer
is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. In that
respect a board's duty is no different from any other responsibility it
shoulders, and its decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they
otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business judgment."
66
Although the duty may not be different, the context and possibility of self
dealing certainly is. Because of the inherent possibility that the board
might be acting in its own self interest "there is an enhanced duty which
calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the
business judgment rule may be conferred., 67 The directors must show that
they had a reasonable ground for the belief that there exists a danger to
corporate policy.6 As pointed out earlier, this is always the case in
takeovers. However, the directors satisfy that burden "by showing good
faith and reasonable investigation .... 69 The court defined good faith by
applying the primary purpose rule (i.e. that the action was not solely or
primarily out of a desire to maintain control) and added the further
requirement that the response be reasonably related to the threat posed• 70
(proportionality requirement).
The third in the "trilogy" of the mid-1980's Delaware cases involved
the director's responsibilities when the sale of the corporation becomes
inevitable.7' After rejecting an offer for Revlon on the basis that the price




65 See Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
66 id. at 954.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 955.
69 Id. (quoting Cheff, 190 A.2d at 555).
70 Id.
71 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
72 Id. at 172.
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raider (Pantry Pride) would be successful, Revlon self-tendered for 30% of
its outstanding shares and sought a white knight (granting the white knight
a lockup option to purchase Revlon assets at favorable prices if another
party acquired 40% of the company).73 The court upheld the first rejection
of Pantry Pride's offer and the self tender but invalidated the lockup
agreement with the white knight. After first requiring that the board show
that Revlon responded in good faith and with reasonable investigation to a
danger to the corporation, the court determined that the directors had
responded reasonably to a perceived threat to the corporate entity (thus
meeting the Unocal requirement).74  In refusing to apply the business
judgment rule to the subsequent actions of the directors the court
determined that at that time the ultimate demise of Revlon was no longer in
question and that the director's duty had changed: "It no longer faced
threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders'
interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole question of defensive
measures became moot. The directors' role changed from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company."75 Finally, the court ruled that the
board could consider constituencies other than the shareholders in making
their decision but that there had to be "rationally related benefits accruing
to the stockholders. 76
In 1990 the same court applied the above rules to a case involving Time
Inc., Warner Communications, Inc. and, Paramount Communications.
Time and Warner agreed upon a merger. During the negotiations there was
no evidence that any other company was interested in a takeover of Time
but the agreement made reference to the possibility and included "a
panoply of defensive devices,. including a staggered board, a 'poison pill'
preferred stock rights plan triggered by an acquisition of 15% of the
company, a fifty-day notice period for shareholder motions, and restrictions
on shareholders' ability to call a meeting or act by consent. 7M Before the
plan was consummated Paramount intervened and made a $175 per share
tender offer for Time (later increased to $200). Time responded, after
much consideration, by making its own tender offer for 51% of the shares





77 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
78 Id. at 1144 (footnote 6).
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debt.7 9 The remaining shares were to be acquired later for a combination of
cash and securities.
The court held that the original merger agreement was protected by the
conventional business judgment rule because there was no threat of a
hostile takeover at that time. The court then applied Unocal's enhanced
business judgment rule to its tender offer for Warner. After determining
that the board had satisfied its duty of thorough investigation (Smith) the
court reviewed the board's actions and determined that it was reasonable
for them to view Paramount's actions as a danger to the Time-Warner
agreement. 80 The court then looked at Time's consideration of long-term
approach to investor's interest versus short-term profits and concluded that
the directors were not required to "abandon a deliberately conceived
corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit" so long as there was a
proper business purpose.8' The court applied the second Unocal test
(proportionality) and found that the response was reasonable to the threat
posed. 2 Accumulating between $7 and $10 billion debt, in the court's
opinion, was apparently not so extreme that reasonable jurors could
disagree over its appropriateness. Finally, the court applied the Revlon
standard and determined that a takeover never became inevitable and,
therefore, the board was under no obligation to seek the highest bid.
Certainly, however, some sort of business combination was inevitable. In a
telling line, the court noted that Time's actions were at least partly
motivated by a desire to maintain Time's "corporate culture".83 Because a
takeover by an outside interest is virtually always going to change
"corporate culture", this holding could open the way for unlimited
rationales for resisting a tender offer.
Following Paramount Delaware's approach to director's duties in the
takeover context is clearly discernible. The directors bear the initial burden
of showing that they satisfied the requisite reasonable care in investigating
the decision and that their response was reasonably related to the threat
posed. Following such a showing the directors will be afforded the
protection of the business judgment rule in defending the reasonableness
and rationality of their decision. Their duty of loyalty is met by showing
that their primary purpose was not to maintain control. The directors can
consider constituencies other than shareholders so long as they can show
benefits to the shareholders. As long as they can meet these requirements
the board of director's actions will not be reviewed at the jury level.
79 Id. at 1148-49.
80 Id. at 1152.
81 Id. at 1154.
82 id. at 1155.
83 Id. at 1152.
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V. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN THE TAKEOVER CONTEXT
According to Henry Johnson, among others, the "purpose of the
business judgment rule is the protection of directors in ordinary business."' 4
It is important that corporate management be able to make business
decisions without the fear of being held liable. In publicly traded
corporations there will virtually always be one or more shareholders who
will disagree with any given decision, and corporate business would grind
to a standstill if they were able to challenge ordinary management decisions
in the courts without providing directors with the benefit of the business
judgment rule. Although a number of scholars and courts believe it is
proper to treat ordinary business and takeover defenses with the same
deference to target management," it is inappropriate to apply the business
judgment rule in the takeover context. While some courts have agreed with
this general proposition of treating the two situations equally, they often
apply the rule because of "the weight of authority" and sheer inertia of
precedent.86 The best argument for the rule is that management is in the
best position to make most decisions and courts are ill-equipped to analyze
many business decisions. There are two very good reasons for not applying
it in the takeover context, however. First, as suggested by Henry Johnson,
"while it is true that the officers and directors of a corporation are in a
unique position of 'expertise' and 'knowledge' in corporate matters it is
far from clear that this expertise extends into the takeover decision."87 The
decision of whether to accept or reject an offer is precisely the type of
decision tailor-made for the investor and not for corporate management.
Furthermore, "the shareholder did not consult management when buying
their shares, nor did management intervene in the purchase. Why, then
should corporate management become directly (and expensively) involved
in a potential transfer of shares between a buyer and seller"? 88 A tender
offer is an offer to purchase stock from an investor. It is a contractual
relationship to which management is not a party. If an investor sought to
sell stock in an ordinary transaction on one of the markets it would be quite
surprising to find a manager of the corporation attempting to intervene.
The second reason is that there is always an inherent conflict of interest in
the takeover context.8 9 While many courts have recognized that the
84 Henry Johnson, Anti-Takeover Actions and Defenses: Business Judgment or Breach of
DuT, 28 VILL. L. REV. 51, 56 (1982) [hereinafter Johnson].
See e.g., Schubert, supra note 19, at 694.
86 See Minstar Acquiring Corp v. AMF Inc., 621 F.Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
87 Johnson, supra, note 84, at 60; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 17, at 1164.
Id. at 62.
89 See Michael Keliher, Anti-Takeover Measures-What Standard Should be Used to Evaluate
Them, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 419, 428 (1988) [hereinafter Keliher].
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potential for abuse resulting from this conflict exists, they typically gloss
over it. 90 In his blunt dissent in Panter v. Marshall Field Co., Judge
Cudahy pointed out this conflict of interest by stating that "the majority
here moved one giant step closer to shredding whatever constraints still
remain upon the ability of corporate directors to place self interest before
shareholder interest in resisting a hostile tender offer for control of the
corporation. '
Some courts restrict the application of the rule to "disinterested"
directors.92 The primary problem with this approach is that in defending
against a takeover there are no truly disinterested directors. Again, Judge
Cudahy addresses this issue in a less than subtle manner referring to the
idea that directors are disinterested as "appallingly naive": directors are "at
the very least, 'interested' in their own positions of power, prestige and
prominence (and in their not inconsequential perquisites) . . . in
maintaining the public reputation of their own leadership."93
In Bennett v. Propp the court stated that the "directors are of necessity
confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is
difficult... Hence, in our opinion, the burden should be on the directors to
justify such a purchase as one primarily in the corporate interest." 94 This
holding was cited with approval in Cheff, but the court was satisfied that
management believed there "there was a reasonable threat to the continued
existence of [the company], or at least existence in its present form." 95 The
director's rebutting of this burden has also been stated as "fairness of the
transaction", "rational and proper purpose," and "valid corporate
purpose. 96 As Michael Keliher has noted, this is no standard at all because
"the fundamental nature of a takeover is that the business will cease to
operate in its present corporate form."97 This holding clouds the primary
purpose rule and seems to stand for the proposition that directors:
But see Norlin Corp v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d at 264; see also Johnson, 629 F.2d at
3009?. Rosenn, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d at 299 (Judge Cudahy, concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
92 See e.g. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
93 Panter, 646 F.2d at 300 (Judge Cudahy, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
94 Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d at 409.
95 Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d at 556.
Bennett, 187 A.2d at 409; see also Cheff, 199 A.2d at 556.
97 Keliher, supra note 89, at 438.
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convinced that control is threatened by an outside interest which
arguably would advocate some change classifiable with any
verisimilitude as 'policy,' can decide a priori that such a change
would not be in the best interest of all the shareholders. Having so
decided, they may with impunity proceed to make substantial
expenditures of corporate funds to acquire at premium prices
sufficient shares to assure that the general body of shareholders
will be deprived of all opportunity effectively to exercise their
franchise.9"
Some have argued that the primary purpose rule is no requirement at all
because "hindsight and the advice of expert counsel can practically always
set forth some rational and proper purpose to explain its conduct." 99
VI. THE MARSHALL FIELD & CO. CASE
A closer analysis of Panter v. Marshall Field1°° shows some of the
shortcomings of applying the business judgment rule in the takeover
context. In February 1978 Carter Hawley Hale (hereinafter CHH)
announced it would make a tender offer for outstanding shares of Marshall
Field & Company for cash and stock.'0 ' During the previous October CHH
had proposed a merger with Marshall Fields. At a special meeting of
Marshall Field's directors immediately following the first contacts, the
board determined that "the proposed business combination should not be
considered."' 2  This decision, although the directors stated that the
interests of the shareholders were being considered, was made without
formal investigation of the proposal by the board. The board made this
decision at the very same meeting at which it was proposed.'0 3 Making
98 Israels, Corporate Purchase of its Own shares-Are There New Questions?, 50 CORNELL L
Q. 620, 624 (1965), as quoted in William Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards
Act, 29 BUS. LAW 1101, 1105. (1974).
99 Marc Steinberg,. Application of the Business Judgment Rule and Related Judicial
Principles-Reflections form a Corporate Accountability Perspective 56 N.D. LAWYER 903, 906
(1981) [hereinafter Steinberg].
100 The following discussion is taken from both the decisions of the United States District
Court, 486 F.Supp. 1168 (N.D. Il. 1980), and that of the United States Court of Appeals, 646 F.2d
271 (7th Cir. 1981), [hereinafter Panter III to which the District Court's decision was appealed.
101 Panter I at 1172. In considering the defendant's motion for a directed verdict the District
Court reviewed the facts as presented in the plaintiff's complaint. The standard applied by the court
was that it must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs; and all reasonable
inferences which can be drawn from the evidence must be in their favor." Id. at 1174.
102 Id. at 1178 (emphasis added).
103 ..
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such a decision without more investigation is, at the very least, arguably a
violation of the board's duty of care. The court found, however, that the
board was entitled to a directed verdict. The jury was not even allowed to
rule on what was essentially a factual question.
Marshall Field was considered by many to be vulnerable to a takeover
"because of its accumulated worth, the strength of its balance sheet, its
large cash reserves, and its borrowing potential."1 4 Plaintiffs even ar ued
that "investing shareholders studied Field's earning reports, researched its
performance and determined that (Field in mid-1976) was a good company
for a takeover."' '  It should be remembered that for the purposes of
considering a motion for directed verdict the evidence must be considered
in the plaintiff's favor. These facts hardly supports an argument that the
board's anti-takeover actions were primarily in the shareholder's interests.
Plaintiffs further provided evidence that Marshall Field had developed a
consistent strategy for defeating takeover attempts before shareholders had
an opportunity to act.
Marshall Field was the target of several proposed mergers during the
1970's. In 1970, when Associated Dry Goods Company proposed a merger
with Marshall Field, the board approved the acquisition of stores that could
create anti-trust complications for the proposed combination. 0 6  Plaintiff
argued that the acquisition was designed to create just such
complications. °7 Five years later Federated Department Stores proposed a
merger with Marshall Field; the board responded by threatening an anti-
trust action.0 8 The following year, in 1976, the Dayton Hudson Company
proposed a merger to Marshall Field's board, who then began making
preparations for acquiring stores that were in competition with Dayton
Hudson.' 9 When Dayton Hudson withdrew its proposal the Marshall Field
board dropped its interest in acquiring the stores.n
104 Id. at 1175.
105 Id.
106 Marshall Field "acquired Halle Brothers, a retailer with stores in Cleveland and other Ohio
communities, and in Erie and West Erie, Pennsylvania. Associated had stores in the same cities."
Panter I at 1177 (emphasis added). These acquisitions proved to be unprofitable. Panter I at 305
(Jude Cudahy, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
That Marshall field had retained attorney Joseph Flom, "a lawyer whose expertise was in
proxy contests, mergers and acquisitions, [and] tender offers" and who advised just such a policy for
blocking takeover attempts, gives significant credence to the claim." Panter I at 1176.
108 Id. at 1177. Much of the evidence regarding the board's actions was excluded on the ground
that it was irrelevant. Panter I1 at 305-06, (Judge Cudahy, concurring in part, dissenting in part). Far
from being irrelevant, it suggests a policy of independence without regard for the business merits of the
progsal; specifically what the plaintiffs were arguing.
1 The board "embarked on a program to acquire certain Liberty House stores in Portland,
Oregon and Tacoma, Washington, a market area where there was an overlap between Dayton-Hudson
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In 1978, when it became clear to Marshall Field directors that CHH
would pursue an unfriendly takeover attempt, the board followed
essentially the same course of conduct that it had on the previous
occasions."' Marshall Field's opposition to any merger, whether friendly
or hostile, was so consistent that two directors testified that they recalled
"it being stated as a policy." 1 2  When such becomes a policy of a
corporation without regard to the financial merits of a particular offer, there
exists a significant likelihood that directors have breached theirduty to the
shareholders. By applying the business judgment rule, the court precluded
consideration by the jury.
At the close of plaintiff's case the court granted defendant's motion for
directed verdict. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed. Despite the strong case the plaintiffs made for breach of
duty the Court of Appeals determined that there was "no basis on which
reasonable jurors" could find such a breach.' The presumption created by
the business judgment rule precluded, as it does in nearly every instance, a
review by a jury of management actions in a situation where their
continued employment is likely to depend on blocking a tender offer. In
Panter the issue of whether directors violated their duties to the
shareholders was easily a question upon which a jury could find for the
plaintiffs. It is likely that the directors violated both the duty of loyalty and
the duty of care owed to the shareholders.
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR ABOLISHING THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN
THE TENDER OFFER CONTEXT
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel advocate a rule that target
management should be required to remain entirely passive when faced with
a tender offer.' 14 In support of this they argue that defensive measures
stores and those operated by Liberty House." Panter I at 1177 (emphasis added).
Id.
II One month after CHH's intentions became clear, the board authorized the acquisition of a
store in the Galleria (a Houston Texas shopping mall) and five stores in the Pacific Northwest. Panter I
at 1182. CHH had stores in all of these locations, thus raising possible anti-trust problems with a
merger. The District Court accepted, and the Circuit Court agreed, that this simply represented long-
term expansion plans. Panter II at 296. However, no executive of Marshall Field had previous
recollection of discussing Houston as an area for expansion. Panter I at 1182. Furthermore, the board
attempted to purchase another competitor of CHH (Dillard's department store) when, two weeks earlier,
the board did not even know whether the store was a "standard retailer or a discount operation." Panter
1I at 307, footnote 18.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 299.
114 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 17, at 1198.
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harm shareholder wealth." 5 They further argue that management is in no
better position than shareholders to judge the merits of a tender offer;'
16
that there "is no signal that separates intransigent resistance from honest
efforts to conduct an auction for the shareholder's benefit";'" and that such
a rule would be easy to enforce-the only inquiry for the courts would be a
determination of whether management had remained inactive."' To this,
Professor Johnson, among others, has advocated that "management should
be uniformly precluded from advocating corporate charter amendments"
that protect against tender offers." 9 At the other end of the spectrum ARE
Mr. Lipton and his supporters'2 They advocate an active board and would
oppose significant restraints that might be placed on management in
defeating tender offers.'2 ' Aside from the economic aspects, this position is
premised on the idea that a "takeover bid is no different than any other
fundamental business decision."' 2  There is, however, a significant
distinction between "fundamental" decisions and the conduct of ordinary
business. "Fundamental" decisions can affect the very structure,
ownership, and purpose of a corporation. "Ordinary" business decisions,
on the other hand, are typically related to how a corporation carries out its
basic mission and functions. This distinction is evident from the fact that
many, although not all, "fundamental" decisions require shareholder
approval.
Although there is logic to the Easterbrook and Fischel total passivity
approach, I propose abolishing the business judgment rule in the tender
offer context instead. First, however, the reasons for not accepting their
approach merit attention. Their proposal is simply not realistic. One
reason is the large amount of state and federal statutory law that would
have to be repealed. State corporate law and anti-takeover legislation, as
well as the Williams Act and other federal securities legislation envision
management involvement in various business combination processes
whether friendly or hostile. Because these laws have withstood
constitutional attack they would have to be altered or abolished through the
legislative process. The widespread acceptance of the laws, and the
tendency of state legislators to "protect" their constituencies and domestic
Id. at 1173.
116 Id. at 1193.
117 Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1200.
119 Johnson, supra note 84, at 74.
120 See supra notes 2-4, 6-7 and 15-16, and accompanying text.
121 Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom; an Update After One Year, 36
Bus. LAW. 1017, 1017-21 (1981).
122 Lipton, supra note 2, at 120.
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corporations from out-of-state attacks, makes the repeal of state legislation
seem unlikely. Further, although those advocating passivity claim that such
a rule would be easy to enforce because the courts would merely have to
measure passivity, this is an over-simplification.' What they overlook is
the difficulty of determining whether any given action by a board of
directors is related to a potential takeover attempt or simply an act in
conducting the ongoing business of the corporation. For example, if an
entity expressed an interest in acquiring a corporation and the directors of
that corporation subsequently made an acquisition which w s in the best
interests of the corporation's expansion plans but which created anti-trust
problems for the would-be acquirer, the question of passivity would not be
nearly as simple as Easterbrook and Fischel suppose. There are an infinite
number of scenarios that could raise difficult questions as to whether
management was resisting a takeover or merely carrying on the legitimate
business of the corporation.
When individuals or business entities purchases stock, they are buying
a piece of the company. This is true whether the purchaser intends on
holding the stock in perpetuity or for a short time. Despite Professor
Lipton's assertion that the two should be treated differently, such an
approach is as inappropriate as it is unfeasible. 24 Shareholders, whether
their view is short-term or long-term, are seeking a return on their
investment and placing their money at risk in so doing. They are the
owners of the company to the same extent as other entrepreneurs who risks
their capital in starting up a small business venture. Where the sole
proprietor hires a manager to oversee the daily operations of the business,
shareholders hire a board of directors and officers to run the corporation.
Directors and officers are the agents of shareholders. As such, they owe
their primary duty to the shareholders in much the same way a store
manager or employees owe a duty to the owner.
When a corporation offers its stock to the public it is offering to enter
into a contractual relationship with the purchaser for the sale of a portion of
the company. When an individual or business entity makes a tender offer
they are offering to enter into a contractual relationship with the owners of
the corporation for the sale of their property. The offer is not made to
management. It would be hard to imagine a court affording a rule similar
to the business judgment rule to a manager who attempted to prevent
someone from making an offer to the owner of a sole proprietorship to
purchase a part or all of the business.
123 See supra note 17.
124 Upton, supra note 2, and accompanying text.
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As previous discussion makes clear, directors and officers sometimes
intervene to block the offer or force the bidder to withdraw it before the
shareholders have had an opportunity to accept or reject it. The business
judgment rule has often shielded management from liability for actions,
which in some circumstances could be considered tortious interference with
a contractual relationship. Although strict neutrality may not be an
appropriate response, the courts should adopt a rule which precludes the
ability of management from using the business judgment rule in the
takeover context where there is an obvious conflict of interest and where
management's duty of loyalty is always called into question.
As discussed below, even without the benefit of the business judgment
rule corporations, shareholders and, management would still be protected
from predatory and unwanted attacks by provisions of the Williams Act,
state anti-takeover legislation and, shareholder-approved defensive
measures (shark repellant).
VIII. THE WILLIAMS ACT
In 1968 Congress passed the Williams Act (amending the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934).' 5 The Act requires potential bidders and large
shareholders to disclose background information and any acquisition
plans.'26 Regulation of tender offers are further governed by specific
provisions. 27
The disclosure requirements of section 13(d) and 14(d) insure that
management and shareholders receive accurate information about the
125 15 U.S.C. § § 78m (d) & (e), 78n (d), (e) & (f), (1982).
126 The Act requires any person or business entity that acquires more than 5% of a class of
equity securities of a publicly traded corporation (and others falling within the statutory definition) to
disclose, inter alia, information regarding that person's identification, background and, "if the purpose
of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire control of the business of the issuer of the
securities, any plans or proposals which such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets
to or merge it with any other persons, or to make any other major change in its business or corporate
structure." This disclosure must be made to the issuer of the security, the exchange on which it is
traded and, the Securities Exchange Commission. Id. at § 78m (d)(l)(a)-(c).
127 Id. at § 78n (d) and (e). When a tender offer is made the bidder must file disclosure
statements with the SEC, the target company and the exchange which include essentially the same
information, plus financial statements, required by § 78m(d), (supra). Further, the bidder must publish
a notice of the tender offer in a newspaper of general circulation in order to inform the shareholders of
the offer and its contents. The tender offer must remain open for at least twenty days. The bidder must
purchase shares on a pro-rata basis if purchasing less than 100% of the company's outstanding shares;
must make the offer to all shareholders and; pay all shareholders the highest amount paid to any
shareholder. Shareholders are allowed to revoke their tenders at anytime during the tender period.
Finally, within ten days of the offer, target management is required to provide shareholders with their
opinion of the tender offer (they may recommend acceptance, rejection, express neutrality or they may
state that they are unable to offer an opinion).
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tender offer. Although management may have better knowledge about the
value of the corporation, for ownership purposes the value that matters is
that which has been determined by the market. Shareholders have just as
much expertise, if not more, in comparing this measure with the tender
offer. The substantive provisions regarding the procedures to be followed
in a tender offer provide protection to shareholders, and consequently
weaken the rationale for management intervention. The price provisions
protect shareholders from discriminatory offers; the time guarantees and
pro-rata requirement provide shareholders with time to consider their
decision with deliberation and increase the possibility for a bidding war-
which would be lost if management intervened and; the ability to revoke
their tenders further lessens any coercive effects that may exist in the offer.
The most important provision, from the perspective of actions by the
board of directors, is the requirement that management make a recom-
mendation to the shareholders. This provision allows the directors to make
their arguments to shareholders if they believe the offer should be rejected.
It could be argued that directors are unlikely to recommend rejection for
fear that it would harm their chances to remain on the board should the
bidder prove successful. Two points should be made in response to this.
First, if directors honestly believe that acceptance is a bad idea and fail to
recommend rejection, then they are in breach of their duty to
shareholders-the very duty presumed by the business judgment rule to be
satisfied in their actions were they to attempt to block the offer. Second, if
a bidder is making a tender offer that includes a significant premium for
shareholders, they have likely determined that the market has priced the
stock low because of current management. Under these circumstances the
directors will likely be voted out by the successful bidder regardless of
whether or they recommended acceptance to the shareholders.
IX. COERCIVE TWO-TIER TENDER OFFER AND STATE ANTI-TAKEOVER
LEGISLATION
Target management often argues that in preventing a tender offer they
are protecting shareholders from the negative effects of a two-tier takeover.
Although there is merit to the argument, nearly every state has passed
legislation which protects shareholders from the coercive effects of these
takeovers. 28 In this type of tender offer the bidder makes a two part
proposal. In the first, or front-end, the bidder makes a cash or valuable
stock offer for a controlling (or dominant) percentage of the corporation's
128 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN § 203(a); N.Y.B.C.L. § 912; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1 -41-2 et.
seq.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.19.040(1); OHIO GEN CORP. LAW § 1701.59; WIS. STAT. ANN. §
180.726.
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stock. In the back-end, or take-out merger, the bidder buys out the
remaining shares for considerably less, often with low grade debt securities
(junk bonds). The bidder can accomplish the back-end because at that
point it owns a controlling percentage of the voting stock. Shareholders
that do not tender their shares in the front-end risk having all of their shares
converted, at lower prices, in the back-end. Therefore, they are often
coerced into tendering in the front-end at a premium price and having their
remaining shares purchased for significantly less in the back-end; they thus
end up having to sell all of their shares at an average amount that may
equal, or even be less, than the current market value. 2 9
Many state laws have been passed to prevent coercive two-tier tender
offers. Typically a law will state that when'a bidder acquires a certain
percentage of a corporation's shares the company is barred from corporate
restructuring for a significant period of time. The Delaware statute
prohibits "business combinations" for three years and includes mergers in
the definition of business combinations. 30 Washington extends the limit to
five years.' 3' An exception is written into the law if the board of directors
approves the merger prior to the bidder's acquisition of shares or if a super-
majority of shareholders, other than the bidder, approve it. 32  These
provisions force the bidder to negotiate with the board of directors prior to
beginning its takeover attempt or to provide a take-out price that satisfies
the shareholders, thus assuring a premium price for their shares. An
additional exception is sometimes made where the bidder acquires more
than 85% of the corporations shares. 133 This insures that the bidder will
acquire the great majority of shares in the front-end of the tender offer.
These laws have faced'and survived constitutional challenges. 34
Some states have also passed laws which allow directors to "give due
consideration to the social, legal and economic effects on employees,
customers and suppliers of the corporation and on the communities and
geographical areas in which the corporation ... operates.' 35 As pointed
out by former SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth, the "new
constituencies approach are ill conceived ... [the approach] would permit
129 For a discussion of a two-tier tender offer see CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69, 74-76; Cindi Ingram, An Overview and Economic Analysis of Tender Offers and
Management's Response to takeover threats, 54 Mo. L REV. 953, 958-60 (1989) [hereinafter Ingrami;
David Schubert, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa petroleum Co.: A New Era of Fiduciary Duty, 38 BAYLOR L.
REV. 687, 701-03 (1986).
130 DEL. CODE ANN. § 203(a).
131 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.19.040(1).
132 See e.g. DEL. CODE ANN. § 203(a).
Id.
1 34 See e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
135 O.R.S. 60.357(5).
TENDER OFFERS
any action justifiable in terms of one of the many diverse
constituencies. This type of legislation is an example of why a judicial
rule of strict passivity is not feasible. But, at the same time, it is illustrative
of why directors should not enjoy the benefit of the business judgment rule.
By combining such legislation with the wide latitude provided to directors
by the business judgment rule it is nearly impossible for shareholders to
hold directors accountable for actions that may be contrary to the
shareholder's best interests.
X. SHAREHOLDER APPROVED SHARK REPELLANT
An option that is available, and should be available, to shareholders
that wish to prevent takeovers are various forms of shark repellent. These
are amendments to corporate charters and bylaws that discourage tender
offers in the first place. A rule such as that proposed by Professor Johnson
(see supra) which prohibits management from advocating such
amendments is inappropriate. There could be instances where failure to
advocate such actions would constitute a breach of duty to shareholders.
Rather than a rule which prohibits directors from advocating shark
repellants, an appropriate rule would require that all such devices be
approved by shareholders. Although shark repellants could be used by
management to maintain control, they would have been voted on by the
shareholders at a time when they were not under coercion. In instances
where a provision, that was not approved by shareholders, does not fall
under an accepted definition of shark repellant but appears to perpetuate
management's control, courts should review the director's adoption of them
with a heightened level of scrutiny. This would help to prevent directors
from avoiding the shareholder approval requirement through creative
drafting.
This discussion should not be read as an endorsement of the adoption
of shark repellants; in general, they serve to insulate management from the
kind of scrutiny which this paper argues they should be subject to. Rather,
it is a recognition that shareholders should be free to adopt them if they so
choose and that to limit a corporation's ability to use them would be to
place a limitation on the owners of a corporation from maintaining control
of their property. Another purpose for discussing shark repellants is to
argue that there are options available to shareholders and management
should they sincerely believe that it is in the best interests of a corporation
to protect current management against outside control.
136 Quoted in Dennis Block and Yvette Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of
Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L. J., 44, 71 (1983).
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One shark repellant option is to include a "fair price" provision in the
charter or by-laws. This provision could require a bidder who is making a
two-tier offer to pay the same amount in the take-out merger as is offered in
the initial tender offer. As an alternative it could require a super-majority
vote of shareholders, excluding the bidder, to approve a take-out merger.
This latter alternative is similar to the state anti-takeover legislation
previously discussed. 37 Another form of shark repellant is in the form of
staggered elections for the board of directors. It would provide that only a
portion of directors would be elected each year, or other length of time.
For example, the amendment could provide that only one-third of the
directors would be elected every two years. Although a raider could elect
one-third of the directors at the next scheduled election, two additional
years would have to pass before control of the board could be attained. A
raider could have to wait nearly four years before taking actions that the
initial board opposed. This requirement could deter many takeover
attempts.
A third shark repellant approach is the poison pill.' 38 Simply put, a
poison pill is a provision that decreases the value of a corporation that
becomes effective when a bidder acquires a predetermined percentage of
the corporation's stock. The typical form is through the use of call options.
The corporation issues short-term options, typically one year in duration,
to its shareholders. The option is normally redeemable by management
prior to any takeover. The option entitles the holder to purchase shares in
the target company (a "flip-in" plan) or in the bidder's company (a "flip
over" plan) at very low prices. The "flip over" poison pill can entitle the
purchase of the bidder's stock as an obligation of the target if there is a
merger-the obligations of the target are assumed by the surviving
corporation by operation of law. A "flip-over" provision becomes effective
following a merger; they have largely been upheld by courts. 139 A "flip-in"
pill can become effective upon other conditions including self-dealing by
the bidder; they may receive closer scrutiny by the courts.
' 40
Shark repellants allow shareholders to prevent hostile takeovers from
occurring. The provisions place the question of control where it belongs:
with the owners of the corporation. They do so without raising the specter
of conflict of interest and without the need for the application of the
business judgment rule.
137 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
138 For a discussion of poison pills see Leo Herzel and Richard Shepro, The Changing Fortunes
of Takeover Defenses, 15 SEC. REG. L. J. 116,121-29 (1987); Ingram, supra note 129, at 969-72.
139 See e.g., Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
140 See e.g. Minestar, supra note 85; see also Unilever Acquisitions Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks,
618 F.Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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XI. CONCLUSION
In striking down an Illinois anti-takeover law in Edgar v. Mite, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated that the statute allowed the Secretary of State to
block a tender offer and deprive the shareholders "the opportunity to sell
their shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their
highest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and
competition, is hindered."'141 That same year the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit declared options granted by an oil company invalid
because they were manipulative; "circumventing [the] natural forces of
market demand" for share prices. 42 What these courts failed to derive from
these rulings is that the protection afforded by the business judgment rule
allows directors almost unfettered discretion in blocking tender offers,
thereby manipulating the market price of the corporation's stock. The
market price is what shareholders can receive for their shares at a given
moment. When management deprives shareholders the opportunity to
obtain that price it relegates them to the price they can then obtain on an
exchange. The business judgment rule often deprives the shareholders of
their ability to seek redress.
When a tender offer is made at a premium price the bidder has not
identified a corporation that is undervalued in its current form. Rather, the
bidder has identified inefficient management imposing agency costs on the
owners; the market has valued the corporation as it exists under that
management. As Ronald Gilson points out, when "management can use
defensive tactics to obtain a degree of control over tender offers similar to
that given it over mergers and sales of assets, then the corporate structure is
fundamentally altered in a fashion which allows management effective
monopoly power over corporate control.' ' 43 The business judgment rule
provides management with that "degree of control." By denying the
application of the rule in the tender offer context a balance between
management's freedom to operate the corporation and shareholder's rights
can be struck.
The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that the shareholder's remedy
lies in removing directors with which they are dissatisfied. 44 The court
refuses to recognize that it is too late in closing the barn door after the
horses have left; the premium offered by the bidder is long gone by the
time the shareholders can learn of the action and vote the directors out.
'1142 Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. at 643.
142 Mobil v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 375 (6th Cir. 1981).
143 Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 846 (1981) [hereinafter Gilson].
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d at 946.
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The court also fails to recognize the prohibitive costs and typical lack of
success in waging a proxy contest for control of boards of directors.
Following a defeated tender offer this remedy is totally ineffective.
Once directors know that courts will apply the business judgment rule
to their actions, they know what steps to take-having previously decided
to resist tender offers-to insulate themselves from liability. One author
has suggested, after reviewing Smith v. Van Gorkom, that "Directors will
not be able to satisfy this requirement (duty of care) by initiating a series of
cosmetic decisional processes ... merely parading a set of investment
bankers, attorneys and accountants through corporate boardrooms will not
be enough to protect corporate directors from potential liability."'' 45 This is
naive. As previously pointed out, management can almost always protect
itself: with "hindsight and the advice of expert counsel [it] can practically
always set forth some rational and proper purpose to explain its
conduct."'
146
To establish a prima facie case against management, a plaintiff should
be required to allege facts which support a claim that directors have
breached either their duty of care, duty of loyalty, or both. The appropriate
measure of the duty of care is that established by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom.147 In order to shift the burden of proof onto
the directors in relation to the duty of loyalty, the plaintiff should be
required to present evidence that maintaining control was a purpose in their
efforts to resist a takeover.
A directed verdict or summary judgment in favor of the directors
should be rare in the takeover context. It should be granted only in
circumstances where the plaintiff clearly fails to present credible evidence
either that management failed to take reasonable care in deciding to prevent
an offer or that maintaining control played any role in their decision. The
primary purpose rule should not play any role in the court's decision or in
instructions to the jury. Management's motivation is a purely factual
question and the jury should be instructed to find in the plaintiff s favor if
it determines that, by the preponderance of evidence, control played any
part in management's decision or subsequent actions. The presumptions of
the business judgment rule should not be applied because it tends to
remove from the jury an ultimate question of fact. Because no directors are
completely disinterested or independent, the presumptions of the business
judgment rule should be denied to all directors.
145 Herbert Wander, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Control Transactions and Today's Business
Jud Tent Rule. 42 Bus. LAW. 29, 40 (1986).
1f6 Steinberg, supra note 99.
147 See supra, notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
TENDER OFFERS
There is an inherent conflict of interest when management opposes a
tender offer. Courts have regularly recognized this fact and have
sometimes placed the initial burden on the board of directors to defend its
actions "because of [the]omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interest."'148 Unfortunately their response has been the
primary purpose test which, as one judge has pointed out, makes the
"presumption virtually unrebuttable."'' 49 The ease with which courts have
glossed over the duty of loyalty by applying this rule has all but removed it
from consideration. The courts have instead focused on the duty of care as
the standard by which to measure management's actions. As noted by
Ronald Gilson, "the business judgment rule does not express the measure
by which a court determines whether management has discharged its duty
of care; rather, its application reflects a conclusion that the management
action in question will not be reviewed at all.1'
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148 Unocal, 493 A.2d 946 at 954.
149 Panter U at 299 (Judge Cudahy, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
150 Gilson, supra note 143.
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